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Abstract 
The 2008 crisis forced central bankers and the representatives 
of academic literature to reassess the prevailing consensus on 
practice of monetary policy. Among other topics, the spotlight 
also fell on the question that how financial stability must be 
treated. Debate renewed on whether the central bank must 
play an active role in preventing and managing market tur-
moil, which consists of leaning against the wind of markets. 
This paper summarises opinions on this issue and offers our 
own conclusions. We found that currently neither the theoret-
ical background nor empirical experience provide compelling 
evidence or a reference for central bankers to move away from 
their existing monetary policy framework and adopt a leaning 
against the wind policy. We conclude that the direct integra-
tion of financial stability considerations into monetary policy 
decision-making - i.e. as a form of rules - is not expected in the 
near future. However, we think that the debate remains open 
for two reasons: firstly, there is some uncertainty regarding the 
success of macroprudential regulation and its proper coopera-
tion with monetary policy and secondly, the theoretical devel-
opment of the implementation of financial cycles into monetary 
decision-making may also yield results.
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1 Introduction
Prior to the crisis, monetary policy in the developed world 
was simple in the sense that its role, basic objective and toolset 
were based on broad consensus spanning academia, markets 
and economic policymakers. The macroeconomic results jus-
tified all of the above: price stability and more stable business 
cycles confirmed the adequacy of monetary policy thinking. 
However, the crisis created such challenges for monetary pol-
icy that theoretical researchers, central bankers and economic 
policymakers were forced to revise the earlier comfortable con-
sensus. Debate re-emerged between the proponents of leaning 
against the wind and of clean-up strategies too.
The aim of this article is to summarise the questions on how 
financial stability must be treated that may be decisive in terms 
of the future of monetary policy. We present the often conflict-
ing views and opinions on the main issues along this topic. 
There is consensus that financial stability must be treated 
as a priority; but there remains disagreement as to the form in 
which this should be achieved: integrated directly into or sepa-
rately from the monetary policy decision-making. In the latter 
case monetary policy only makes ex-post interventions when 
needed, in keeping with earlier practice.  The essence of the 
leaning against the wind (LATW) policy is that the central bank 
plays an active role in preventing and managing market turmoil 
with taking into account the financial cycles in decision-mak-
ing, which often consists of leaning against the wind of markets 
(Woodford, 2012).1 The other approach makes a clear distinc-
tion between the conventional (price stability) objective and the 
objective of financial stability. Within this framework, the price 
stability objective is the mandate of monetary policy while 
financial stability is the mandate of macroprudential policy. 
Stark (2010) emphasises that the sector-specific applicability of 
the macroprudential policy toolset is one of its greatest advan-
tages. These tools include rules that shape the lending capac-
ity and liquidity position of financial intermediaries – mainly 
1 For instance, in the event of a significant credit outflow and asset price 
increases, the central bank maintains a higher interest rate than warranted by 
the purely conventional objective.
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banks – and the requirements designed to control household 
indebtedness. Supporters of the LATW policy consider macro-
prudential tools necessary and important, but they reject their 
exclusive use for managing financial stability risks. Based on 
our knowledge so far, or perhaps precisely in the absence of 
elaborated theoretical basement and relevant experience, the 
latter approach, i.e. managing the two objectives separately, 
seems to be gaining more ground. Furthermore, there are no 
clear answers to numerous questions, such as how LATW pol-
icy can be implemented in practice, what changes would it 
generate in central bank operation and what would be the real 
economic impact of an interest rate level that is higher than the 
one needed to achieve the inflation target. Meanwhile, ques-
tions also abound regarding the use of macroprudential tools. 
As they are largely new tools, their correct calibration is also 
uncertain and consequently, their impact on financial markets 
and the real economy is unknown. In other words, we think that 
choosing between the two ways of securing financial stability 
has been not finalised yet, even if the current practice and insti-
tutional reform have clearly resulted in the distinction between 
the two objectives.
2 Financial stability
The spotlight fell on financial stability as a monetary policy 
objective both for central bankers and academia in relation to 
the 2007–2008 crisis.  Previously, it was widely accepted that 
a monetary regime aiming for price stability would also fos-
ter financial stability. In practice, this meant that the financial 
stability objective only existed implicitly within central bank 
thinking, while the objective of price stability was the priority. 
In addition, it was consensually linked in a narrower sense to 
the lender of last resort (LoLR) as a role of the central bank, 
associated with the freezing up of interbank markets (Blot et 
al., 2015). This is known as the clean-up strategy. Under finan-
cial stress, central banks mop up turmoil in the role of LoLR 
by extending conventional tools; in other words, by providing 
abundant liquidity and maintaining accommodative conditions.
Toniolo and White (2015) provide an overview of the devel-
opment of the mandate of financial stability. The role of central 
banks as lenders of last resort emerged as early as the second 
half of the 19th century as liquidity crisis triggered by indi-
vidual bank failures represented a financial stability risk. This 
required intervention from central banks in order to protect the 
system of financial intermediation and led to the emergence of 
the central bank role of lender of last resort. After World War II, 
direct bank regulation was given a central role in ensuring finan-
cial stability, in the form of administrative control and restric-
tions on lending, on interest rates and on international capital 
flows. After the disintegration of the Bretton-Woods system, 
the creation of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
marked a new direction for regulation. The period leading up to 
the recent crisis was characterised by the focus of the authorities 
on individual institutions mainly, while the stability of the over-
all financial system was not given enough attention.2
Before the crisis, central banks’ views on asset price bubbles 
as a cause of financial instability were based on the Jackson-
Hole consensus reflecting the American approach that emerged 
during the Greenspan era. According to this approach, while 
asset price developments serve as an important indicator for 
monetary policy, central banks only intervene in market pro-
cesses if these affect the inflation target. Accordingly, the main 
task of central banks was limited to restoring order after asset 
price bubbles burst, in the course of which they provided the 
liquidity necessary for market clean-up (referred to as the 
clean-up strategy).
In addition, prior to the global financial crisis, experience 
seemed to confirm the correctness of the principle (for exam-
ple the restoration of market liquidity following the collapse of 
LTCM or the dot.com bubble). This consensus endured because 
monetary policy was successful in terms of its fundamental 
objective. However, the experience of the crisis shed light on 
the shortcomings of this approach. Prior to the recent crisis, 
financial instability emerged despite the attainment of mon-
etary policy objectives during a period of price stability and 
was accompanied by consequences of unexpected magnitude. 
After the crisis, heated debate emerged on what made central 
banks wrong that played a role in emerging financial instability 
and what could have they done to prevent it. Amongst others, 
Woodford (2012) and Yellen (2014) both emphasise that mon-
etary authorities failed to recognise the financial imbalances 
that preceded the crisis and how severe macroeconomic con-
sequences they could lead to. It therefore became clear that 
ensuring price stability was not sufficient in itself to prevent 
the formation of financial instability, and the ex-post clean-up 
strategy aimed at dealing with this instability was insufficient 
for handling the issue. Monetary policy should alter its orienta-
tion in a way that also factors in the criterion of financial stabil-
ity. However, there is no consensus as to the form and degree 
of this reorientation. 
Initial critics to the effect that inflation targeting was a flawed 
monetary regime ceased relatively quickly. There seems to be 
broad consensus in that flexible inflation targeting is not only the 
way forward, but also plays a key role in offsetting the risks of 
the unconventional tools applied after the crisis (CEPR, 2013).
Accordingly, the debate was focused on pre-emptive action 
against financial instability and potential paths to avoid the 
emergence of asset price bubbles. Opinions that the central 
bank must play an active role in preventing and managing 
market turmoil, which consists of leaning against the wind of 
2 It should be noted that what is referred to as microprudential regula-
tion and supervision had its own shortfalls, as highlighted amongst others by 
the de Larosière report (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/
de_larosiere_report_en.pdf).
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markets, gained traction. Whether ensuring financial stability 
should be added to the central bank’s competence list was at 
the centre of both academic debate and among practitioners. 
Meanwhile, the macroprudential line of defence for financial 
stability was created. (IMF, 2015.) 
Two main approaches can be summarised based on the 
papers3 — Smets (2014) and IMF (2015) — of the debates of 
recent years: 
• Implementing LATW in monetary decision-making: It 
entails the adoption of guaranteeing financial stability as 
an additional monetary policy objective supplementing 
the objective of price stability. If financial cycles are fac-
tored in, when the central bank perceives a significant 
outflow of credit and asset price increases, it will tem-
porarily maintain a higher interest rate than required by 
the purely conventional objective. This assumes that fi-
nancial stability can be affected through interest rates.4 
Proponents of this approach do not reject the use of the 
macroprudential toolset but consider it insufficient to 
handle market turmoil in and of itself. However, incorpo-
rating financial instability directly into decision support 
models is essential for conducting active central bank 
policy regarding the LATW. 
• The modified Jackson Hole consensus: In essence, it con-
sists of handling price and financial stability objectives 
separately from each other, the former constituting the 
mandate of monetary policy and the latter constituting 
the mandate of macroprudential policy. Macroprudential 
policy is a regulatory and supervisory framework that is 
aimed at addressing systemic financial risks5 and mini-
mising the resulting losses. Its toolset comprises mainly 
capital and liquidity rules pertaining to the financial sec-
tor that can be used to take pre-emptive, preventive tar-
geted action against the emergence of financial instabil-
ity. Advocates of this view believe that macroprudential 
policy is capable of meaningfully and effectively shaping 
lending cycles and risk-taking, while monetary policy 
lacks the suitable tools. This also means that the mon-
etary policy framework remains largely unchanged in 
terms of the clearly distinguishable set of objectives and 
toolsets of the two areas.
3 These papers summarise and review the researches made in this field.
4 For example: through its impact on leveraging and risk-taking and on the 
rise in market prices.
5 Systemic financial risk mainly refers to flaws within the financial system 
that carry the risk of an unexpected event, potentially one affecting an indi-
vidual institution (such as bankruptcy), that triggers a crisis in a significant part 
of the financial sector, affecting its proper functioning to an extent that severely 
impacts the real economy.
3 Leaning against the wind
It must be clarified in advance that supporters of the LATW 
policy do not reject the need to use macroprudential tools 
(even outside central bank competence); on the contrary, 
they consider their joint application necessary to supplement 
the LATW policy. In Sweden and Norway, the two countries 
mentioned later in this paper as practical examples, numerous 
macroprudential policy tools were introduced also beyond the 
central bank’s mandate6; in other words LATW is not the sole 
means for handling stability risks. Woodford states (referenc-
ing (Woodford (2012)) that macroprudential tools simultane-
ously improve financial stability and support the central bank 
in achieving its price stability objective. This does not mean 
however, that financial stability risks can be ignored in mone-
tary policy decision-making. The main reason is that monetary 
policy has a significant impact on these risks through changes 
in the interest rate. In addition, the crisis clearly revealed the 
shortcomings of financial regulation and supervision beyond 
the absence of macroprudential regulation, including, among 
other things, the deficiencies of the comprehensive, uniform 
supervisory methodology, international coordination and reg-
ulation lagging behind financial innovation. According to a 
third argument, the absence of experience and knowledge 
about macroprudential tools is reason enough for the monetary 
authority to assume an active role in guaranteeing financial sta-
bility. (Olsen, 2015.) 
Papers emphasising the significance of monetary policy 
actions offsetting asset price increases seek the way to incor-
porate financial stability objectives into conventional stability 
objectives (stability of the real economy) without fundamentally 
changing the current regime (Woodford (2012). The success of 
this multiple mandate relies on two key conditions. For one, 
financial variables must be incorporated into monetary policy 
decision-making. Secondly, assigning a financial stability man-
date to the monetary authority must by definition be accompa-
nied by an expansion of the time horizon of monetary policy 
(from the conventional 2–3 year horizon). (Woodford, 2012.)
A common trait of the efforts to incorporate financial 
stability into macroeconomic models and respectively into 
monetary policy objective and reaction function is that they 
attempt to supplement existing conventional frameworks 
with a variable or multiple variables sensitive to changes in 
financial stability risks.
6 Amongst other things, the introduction of the Basel III framework is un-
derway, while in Norway are laws in place that define the maximum LTV ratio 
applicable to household loans. During the introduction of Basel III Sweden has 
established the Financial Stability Council with the representing members of 
the financial supervisory authority, the central bank and the state debt manage-
ment agency, which continuously monitors financial stability risks and issues 
proposals for addressing imbalances.
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Woodford (2012) does not consider it necessary for the cen-
tral bank to monitor market price developments or to estimate 
the divergence of asset prices from their fundamental value. In 
his simplified model, optimal monetary policy is demonstrated 
based on the relationship between three variables. Besides infla-
tion and the output gap, the third variable to be introduced quan-
tifies the expected losses stemming from growing leverage in 
the event of a financial crisis.7  Other authors also use variables 
expressing leverage. In their paper, Borio et al. (2016) conclude 
based on US data for the period of 1985–2015 that a LATW 
policy would have resulted in a higher growth path less prone 
to fluctuations, and in a less aggressive financial cycle. At the 
same time, they warned of the need for systematic policy that 
takes action consistently — not only when financial imbalances 
become apparent — and takes into account the entire financial 
cycle when conducting monetary policy. In their paper, Gelain 
et al. (2015) demonstrate that the proper choice of variables 
describing financial instability may be pivotal in terms of the 
outcome, a fact that must be taken into consideration.8  
While the referenced studies attempt to justify the LATW 
policy, the practical implementation of their findings are still a 
long way off, even according to the authors. The IMF (2015) 
paper summarises the research conducted up to that point and 
comes to a similar conclusion, emphasising that models cap-
turing financial market instability and its management within 
monetary policy are not only overly simplified and require 
significant improvement, but the estimated benefit of pur-
suing an LATW policy is small according to the majority of 
available models. Unless a severe crisis occurs, the policy’s 
macroeconomic costs arising from the higher interest rates 
exceed the benefits derived from the decreasing frequency of 
crises.9  Nonetheless, Svensson (2016) warns that LATW does 
not unequivocally decrease the frequency of crises. In theory, 
higher interest rates curb real debt growth rate and thus finan-
cial stability risks; in other words, the probability of crises; 
however, several factors may dampen this expected impact.10 
7 This is expressed by marginal crisis risk; for the construction of the 
model, see: Woodford (2012).
8 Based on their DSGE model, the authors investigated the impact of mon-
etary policy decisions and measures aimed at the smoothing out of lending cy-
cles. They conclude that if the central banks’ key policy rate hikes are based on 
a high or growing loan-to-GDP ratio and real debt, it may exert a destabilising 
effect. They also found that if monetary policy aims to stabilise the volume of 
debt, the stock of new loans or the rate of credit growth are the most effective 
indicators for supporting decisions, and ultimately for fulfilling the mandate of 
financial stability.
9 However, the IMF (2015) study also suggests that the severity of financial 
crises may also decrease, alongside their frequency, which may warrant further 
research.
10 The author argues that first, if we accept the long-term neutrality of mon-
etary policy, it means that we also accept that the key policy rate is unable 
to change the growth rate of real debt in the long run. Moreover, several pa-
pers cited by the author come to the conclusion that higher interest rates often 
Overall, the cost-benefit analysis concludes that the macro-
economic costs of a central bank policy that aims to decrease 
the risk of financial instability using the traditional tool of the 
interest rate far exceed the expected outcomes of managing 
financial stability risks.
It should also be mentioned that an LATW policy may also 
have a negative impact on central bank credibility, which may 
result in inflation expectations coming loose from their anchor. 
According to the IMF (2015), the threat resides in the fact that 
financial stability is difficult to forecast and it is not fully built 
upon precisely defined variables, which impairs transparency 
and renders communication difficult. Svensson (2016) empha-
sises two cases when LATW may be undermined: for one the 
possibility of triggering deflation due to the pre-emptive action 
made by the central bank in order to ensure financial stabil-
ity; second loss on central bank reputation if a financial crisis 
emerges despite the effort of the central bank. However, pos-
itive impact of LATW on credibility also can be used as an 
argument against these elements. According to Issing (2009), 
the clean-up strategy generates moral hazard: the role of lender 
of last resort spurs risk-taking in the markets and the abundant 
liquidity created to back a bailout to avoid macroeconomic 
losses creates a hotbed for repeated market instability. LATW 
is expected to reduce the frequency and degree of the need for 
such bailouts, so the moral hazard can be mitigated which, in 
turn, reinforces central bank credibility.
An additional challenge is that when conducting an LATW 
policy, the substantial impact on financial stability of numer-
ous financial institutions outside the central bank’s monetary 
system must also be factored in. In other words, assigning the 
mandate of financial stability to the central bank also requires 
an extension of central bank competence beyond the banks. 
This is a particularly central question in a capital market ori-
ented economy. As the crisis has shown, capital market players 
play a pivotal role in destabilisation. As a result of this numer-
ous unconventional tools were targeted specifically at these 
segments. The economists of the Bank of England (Nelson et 
al., 2015) warn that firstly, an LATW policy is limited in terms 
of the degree to which it is able to influence the growth of the 
balance sheets of financial intermediaries - it is capable to affect 
primarily the banks -, and secondly, it may bolster the growth 
of the shadow banking system through its negative impact on 
the traditional banking system (such as higher funding costs).
Central bank practice applied following the financial crisis 
also provided valuable experience.  After the crisis, the practice 
of the Swedish and the Norwegian central bank was to factor 
increase rather than decrease the proportion of real debt relative to GDP. It is 
true that a higher key policy rate may in fact reduce nominal outstanding loans 
and inflation, the latter even to a greater degree and at a faster rate, which may 
result in an unchanged real debt or even an increase in it. Thirdly, it cannot be ig-
nored that credit growth is influenced by other factors besides interest rates too.
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in financial stability criteria along those of LATW in their deci-
sion-making. From 2010 onwards, the focus shifted in both 
countries to preventing excessive household indebtedness, as 
the primary indicator of financial risks. However, setting   the 
key policy rate above what was required to meet the inflation 
target did not yield the desired results, and it was not therefore 
maintainable in the long run. First, it led to negative macro-
economic consequences. In Sweden’s case, inflation fell sig-
nificantly below the target value, while the unemployment rate 
was above target. In Norway, a significant decline in oil prices 
brought inflation temporarily below target, exerting significant 
pressure on the central bank. Meanwhile, the fact that interest 
rates higher than those in many other countries resulted in the 
appreciation of the domestic currency through more intensive 
capital inflows and that also created a challenge. In addition, 
no meaningful improvement was achieved compared to earlier 
trends in financial stability. The rise in household indebtedness 
could not be curbed and housing prices were continuously on 
the rise in both countries (Svensson, 2014 and Olsen, 2015).11 
In other words, for the time being, Sweden and Norway prac-
tice has so far failed to justify this policy.
4 The modified Jackson Hole consensus
Supporters of the modified Jackson Hole consensus believe 
that price stability and financial stability objectives must be 
handled separately both institutionally (the latter should be 
independent from other central bank roles, entrusted to a sep-
arate body) and in terms of the applied tools. Price stability 
should be the mandate of the monetary authority, while finan-
cial stability should fall in the competence of the macropru-
dential authority. Macroprudential policy is therefore an inde-
pendent regulatory and supervisory framework that is aimed 
at minimising the losses stemming from systemic financial 
risks. Macroprudential policy is aimed at making the system of 
financial intermediation more resilient to shocks and prevent-
ing the cyclical12 or structural13 vulnerability of the financial 
system (IMF-FSB-BIS, 2016). Although regulation is aimed 
at banks and other financial intermediaries, it also focuses 
beyond those (such as changes in the financial position of 
households, housing market processes, developments in for-
eign currency debt). Its toolset includes the capital and liquid-
ity requirements under Basel III and debt cap regulations to 
curb household indebtedness (Loan to Value [LTV] and Debt 
to Income [DTI] indicators).
Accordingly, the earlier Jackson Hole consensus is 
amended by the macroprudential authority using its tools to 
11 In addition to this see: the mentioned central bank websites.
12 Stemming from the procyclical changes in asset prices and loans, ex-
cessive outstanding debt or excessive leveraging, or fluctuations in financing.
13 Stemming from the structure of the financial market, the links between 
market participants and the crucial role of some players that are too big to fail.
take countercyclical action in financial markets, while the cen-
tral bank continues to intervene only when price stability is 
jeopardised.
The arguments in favour of this approach stem partly from 
the shortcomings of the alternative LATW policy, as sum-
marised in the previous chapter. Although the traditional cen-
tral bank instrument — i.e. the interest rate – impact both, price 
and financial stability are independent objectives; therefore, 
according to the Tinbergen rule (Tinbergen, 1952), achieving 
both of them concurrently requires at least two independent 
economic policy instruments. Arguments supporting the origi-
nal Jackson-Hole consensus are still valid. Their premise is that 
market pricing is the most effective, and central banks cannot 
take over this role of the market. Central bank action against 
asset price bubbles is questionable. Amongst others, Stark 
(2010) emphasises the difficulties of assessing underlying 
factors of an asset price increase. In many cases, it is unclear 
whether the rise in prices on a specific market is excessive or 
consistent with economic fundamentals. In addition, an interest 
rate hike may have a negative impact on other asset prices that 
are not spoiled by the bubble. Thus monetary restriction may 
become counterproductive by inadvertently curbing essentially 
positive changes — such as growth-stimulating increase in 
investments — through the central bank’s intervention. In addi-
tion, there is no way of knowing in advance what losses, if any, 
will ensue from the bursting of a bubble, and on the other side, 
the costs of pre-emptive central bank intervention. Bayoumi et 
al. (2014) concur with this view in that recognising the emer-
gence of bubbles is not straightforward, and that the macroeco-
nomic impacts of a bursting are difficult to forecast. For this 
reason, central banks face not only the challenge of deciding 
whether or not to intervene, but also of deciding when to do 
so and what degree of interest rate increase is to be applied to 
best curb the negative trends. In another paper (IMF, 2015), the 
IMF also noted that a delayed interest rate hike, when financial 
instability is already mature, only worsens the system further 
and may even trigger a crisis.
Although monetary policy is capable of mitigating risks 
through the interest rate, it is considered too blunt a tool by 
most. Besides Stark’s (2010) opinion referred to earlier, 
Smaghi (2011) also emphasises that if a boom is limited to 
only a few sectors, the conventional monetary policy tool, i.e. 
the key policy rate hike, is not appropriate because the interest 
rate decision affects the entire system of financial intermedia-
tion.  By contrast, macroprudential rules may be applied in a 
targeted, sector-specific manner. Yellen (2014) corroborates the 
opinions14 of the economic costs of higher interest rates applied 
in the context of LATW as presented in the previous chapter, 
referencing in Svensson (2016) and IMF (2015).
14 Svensson (2016) and IMF (2015).
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She draws attention to the impact of a potential drastic inter-
est rate hike implemented for stability reasons, which, besides 
reducing financial system vulnerability, may have additional 
consequences (by making funding substantially more expen-
sive and by delaying investments) such as higher debt expen-
ditures for households or rising unemployment.  This argument 
can also be interpreted as meaning that this consequence may 
contradict the Fed’s current statutory mandate, as it would 
entail a departure both from the employment and, in the event 
of a deflation risk, the price stability objective. 
In addition, the effectiveness of the central bank’s conven-
tional toolset, specifically a rise in short-term interest rates in 
an effort to offset growing bubbles, may also be questionable. 
Galí (2014) found that central bank interventions intended to 
prevent the formation or the growth of bubbles may increase 
asset price volatility. 
Summing up what has been said so far, for the time being 
there is neither an adequate theoretical basis, nor convincing 
empirical evidence to support the explicit incorporation of 
financial cycle management into monetary policy. For now, 
counterarguments appear sounder and therefore, central bank-
ers are unlikely to move away from the current monetary policy 
frameworks to a more uncertain territory. But the case is not 
closed, for two reasons. One is that the crisis drew attention to 
the unsustainable nature of the earlier consensus on the rela-
tionship between financial stability and monetary policy. The 
answer to this at present is that the financial stability mandate 
is predominantly within the competence of supervisory author-
ities, managed independently from monetary policy, and it does 
not explicitly integrate into the central bank’s decision-making 
process. In this context, macroprudential supervision emerged 
alongside the reinforcement of traditional supervision, between 
monetary policy and microprudential supervision. The imple-
mentation of the modified Jackson Hole consensus also means 
that in terms of financial stability, the role of monetary authori-
ties remains broadly unchanged while the supervisory and regu-
latory frameworks are to be radically transformed. However, we 
cannot ignore the defining trend of recent years in the context of 
which tasks and responsibilities of ensuring financial stability 
were added to the mandates of several central banks after the 
crisis: this mandate has been added to the statutes regulating 
central banks and their operation as an objective subordinated 
to price stability. In practice, this means that macroprudential 
supervision, and often microprudential supervision, has been 
integrated into the central bank body.  In such a scenario, the 
central bank, as the supervisory authority, has the power to 
decide when to apply various macroprudential tools and under 
what conditions, but financial stability risk management is not 
directly included in the target function of monetary policy. The 
division of the various powers, regulated at the statutory level, 
into separate organisational and decision-making units addresses 
independence and separation of the different objectives. 
5 Macroprudential policy
The question of how perfect this separation is within a single 
institution leads to another reason why the debate on the role of 
monetary policy in financial stability is still open. It inevitably 
calls into question how much the unconventional policy con-
ducted by central banks recently jeopardises the objective of 
financial stability; whether macroprudential tools are adequate 
and sufficient for fostering financial stability; and what type of 
interaction is created between macroprudential tools and mon-
etary policy. The following section looks at these challenges.
Firstly, one issue is that contrary to monetary policy, mac-
roprudential regulation lacks both an explicit quantifiable final 
or intermediate objective and a clear, tried and tested toolset. 
Adequately defining objectives and finding and calibrating the 
right toolset is therefore a challenge. Furthermore, there is not 
enough experience on the effectiveness of macroprudential 
regulation in achieving the desired aim of preventing financial 
instability. The second challenge is, therefore, effectiveness. 
Thirdly, in the absence of practical experiences, we do not 
know how to adjust macroprudential regulation and monetary 
policy to be consistent with each other.
We have already mentioned the final and potential interme-
diate objectives of macroprudential policy. In their recommen-
dations, the IMF–FSB–BIS (2016) note that macroprudential 
policy is unsuitable for achieving objectives other than the 
stability of the financial system. The IMF (2013) emphasises 
that macroprudential policy cannot be a substitute for a poorly 
functioning monetary policy. In other words, macroprudential 
policy cannot fulfil macroeconomic objectives nor it is able to 
correct the mistakes of macroeconomic policy.15 
In the absence of practical experience, we can only pre-
sume what the impact of macroprudential regulation is. Yellen 
(2014) notes that although there is consensus that macropru-
dential tools will play a key role in ensuring financial stability 
in the future, there are no studies or empirical evidence on the 
potential macroeconomic impacts. As macroprudential pol-
icy affects the target variables of monetary policy, Woodford 
(2012) points out the necessity of the proper adjustment of, and 
close cooperation between these areas, alongside continuous 
communication and information sharing. In its paper, the IMF 
(2013) notes that sound monetary and macroprudential policy 
reinforce each other through multiple channels.  An adequate 
macroprudential policy framework reduces the incidence and 
severity of financial shocks, which requires less frequent and 
sizeable LoLR intervention from the monetary authority and 
reduces the risk of the zero lower bound (ZLB)16.
15 For example, macroprudential policy cannot be expected to correct grow-
ing external indebtedness resulting from a flawed macroeconomic decision.
16 According to conventional practice central banks influence the short 
term yields, but once the zero lower bound is reached, monetary policy looses 
this traditional room for manoeuvre: the usual toolset will be insufficient to 
implement further easing, offset deflationary pressure and stimulate demand. 
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This in turn mitigates the need for extremely accommoda-
tive and unconventional monetary policy, reducing the associ-
ated moral hazard and boosting central bank credibility. This 
also improves the effectiveness of monetary policy. On the 
other hand, amid strongly anchored inflation expectations and 
less volatile and more predictable monetary policy, the cyclical 
issues faced by macroprudential policy are easier to manage. 
At the same time, improper policy in either area (monetary 
or macroprudential policy) has negative impact on the other. 
Due to the lack of knowledge on the quantitative effects of 
macroprudential tools, it is difficult to calibrate the tools cor-
rectly; therefore, the potential deficiencies of macropruden-
tial policy must also be considered. In the absence of relevant 
experience, the IMF (2013) has also warned of the danger of 
monetary policy misestimating the impact of macroprudential 
policy on the macroeconomic variables, which may lead to 
suboptimal decisions.
There has been little research so far on the success of 
macroprudential policy, and there is little actual experience 
in the area. One of the reasons is that the attention shifted to 
macroprudential policy only after the crisis; secondly, it has 
been introduced broadly within the Basel III framework only 
recently, and the introduction of some parts is still in progress. 
In terms of earlier experience, the use of macroprudential tools, 
as summarised by Smets (2014) based on Borio – Shim (2007) 
and Lim et al. (2011), was mainly characteristic of emerging 
countries in the past. Analyses addressing the pre-crisis period 
conclude that macroprudential rules have proven successful 
both in preventing excessive credit boom and asset price rise. 
At the same time, Smets (2014) draws attention to the need to 
calibrate tools correctly and to use multiple tools at the same 
time, as shown by the example of Spain, which failed to pre-
vent the building-up of systemic risks and the outbreak of the 
crisis despite the adequate selection of tools. Lim et al. (2011) 
mention Spain as an example, where dynamic provisioning 
rules were introduced in the early 2000s. These were successful 
in terms of providing initial coverage for the emerging credit 
losses without decreasing capital. However, they were unable 
to curtail the spread of mortgage loans and the spike in property 
prices, and thus to prevent, or even mitigate, the effects of the 
crisis. Meanwhile, although the study finds the tool itself as 
effective, it emphasises poor calibration. Cerutti et al. (2015) 
came to conclusions similar to those earlier studies, conclud-
ing, based on a larger sample and a new period,17 that mac-
roprudential tools curbed the expansion of outstanding loans 
and also shaped property price trends. Akinci & Olmstead-
Rumsey (2015) came to the same conclusion, but emphasised 
that the tools targeting specific sectors were more effective than 
untargeted tools. For instance, the impact of macroprudential 
17 The practice of 119 (advanced and emerging) countries was examined 
over the 2000–2013 period.
regulations on mortgage loans and property prices observed by 
the authors stemmed fully from specifically targeted macropru-
dential tools. 
Overall, the use of macroprudential tools is a more prom-
ising area than application of LATW policy. The selection 
and calibration of the right tools will obviously be an import-
ant topic to be justified in practice and empirically in coming 
years. The fact that macroprudential regulation is more broadly 
accepted among central bankers than LATW also works in its 
favour. At the same time, ensuring the consistency of mone-
tary policy and macroprudential policy is just as important of 
a challenge as the proper selection of tools. If both areas func-
tion smoothly, they may reinforce each other; however, a flaw 
in either one may have a negative impact on the other. Two 
risks can be identified in this regard. The implementation of 
Basel rules is a long and rigid process, essentially with no clear 
opportunity to revise the defined requirements. If these rules 
are not adequately calibrated, it may spur monetary policy to 
correct the flaw. This may lead to serious issues if monetary 
policy attempts to offset an excessively tight macropruden-
tial framework, as this may have a negative impact on both 
objectives. Another source of problems is a scenario where the 
central bank conducts a sustained accommodative monetary 
policy using unconventional tools and macroprudential policy 
attempts to offset the negative impact of this loose stance of 
monetary policy on financial stability by using cyclical tools. 
In this case, a conflict of objectives may emerge, if just because 
of macroprudential action with an opposite effect, the central 
bank maintains or applies unconventional tools for longer or to 
a greater degree than it would be warranted otherwise. In our 
view, from the aspect of future developments in the financial 
stability mandate, it is crucially important to better understand 
and explore these conflicts of objectives.
6 Conclusions
This paper looked at the main challenges facing monetary 
policy regarding financial stability recently. Currently neither 
the theoretical background nor empirical experience provide 
compelling evidence or a reference for central bankers to move 
away from their existing monetary policy framework and adopt 
a leaning against the wind policy. Instead, the two objectives are 
handled separately, with financial stability being the mandate 
of macroprudential policy, while price stability falls within the 
competence of monetary policy. However, the debate remains 
open for two reasons: firstly, there is some uncertainty regard-
ing the success of macroprudential regulation and its proper 
cooperation with monetary policy and secondly, the theoretical 
development of the LATW may also yield results.
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